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Abstract 
 
There has been considerable excitement surrounding the regulation of space resource 
extraction and utilization activities since the 2012 debut of Planetary Resources and Deep 
Space Industries – pioneering companies which shared the ambitious goal of mining asteroids.  
This excitement has spawned national legislation in the United States, Luxembourg and 
potentially more nations.  It has also sparked considerable discussion at the main international 
forum for discussing the international governance of outer space, the Legal Subcommittee of 
the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. Additionally, The Hague 
International Space Resources Governance Working Group was established as a ‘multi-
stakeholder dialogue’ with the aim of developing ‘draft building blocks’ for an ‘international 
framework’. This article examines what resources exist within our solar system, and the 
viability of economic extraction of those resources.  It considers the nature of celestial bodies 
and whether differing approaches to extraction and utilization are necessary or at least worthy 
of consideration.  It also discusses the nature and necessity of an international framework, given 
the potential for conflict over space resources and the need to consider issues of sustainability 
and equity.  Ultimately, this article argues that given the demise of the two asteroid mining 
pioneers, it is worth taking the time to step back and reconsider our approach to the governance 
of space resource activities. 
 
 I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2012, two United States (“U.S.”) based companies, Planetary Resources, Inc. 
(“Planetary Resources”) and Deep Space Industries, Inc. (“Deep Space Industries”) announced 
their existence, and their intention to mine asteroids.  Predictions of the dawn of a “space gold 
rush” and the launch of a trillion-dollar industry were abundant.1 The U.S. enacted the Space 
 
1
Elizabeth Pearson 'Space Mining: the New Goldrush' Science Focus (11 December 2018) Available at: 
https://www.sciencefocus.com/space/space-mining-the-new-goldrush/; Andrew Wong (2018) 'Space Mining 
Could Become a Real Thing - And It Could Be Worth Trillions' CNBC (15 May) 
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/15/mining-asteroids-could-be-worth-trillions-of-dollars.html; Neel V. Patel 
(2017) 'Asteroid Mining Could be a Multi-Trillion Dollar Buisness by 2020' Inverse (28 June) 
https://www.inverse.com/article/33556-asteroid-mining-multi-trillion-dollar-business-asteroid-day-2017; Calla 
Cofield (2016) 'Extraterrestrial Gold Rush: What's Next for the Space Mining Industry' Space.com (21 
November) https://www.space.com/34774-whats-next-for-space-mining.html; Morgon Saletta and Kevin 
Orrman-Rossiter 'All of Humanity Should Share in the Space Mining Boom' The Conversation (17 April 2016) 
Available at: http://theconversation.com/all-of-humanity-should-share-in-the-space-mining-boom-57740; Rob 
Davies (2016) 'Asteroid Mining Could be Space's New Frontier: The Problem is Doing it Legally' The Guardian 
(6 February) https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/feb/06/asteroid-mining-space-minerals-legal-issues; 
'Luxembourg hits on Goldmine, in space' Luxembourg Times (2 February 2016) 
https://luxtimes.lu/archives/8005-luxembourg-hits-on-goldmine-in-space; Peter Terlato (2015)  'NASA is 
Dreaming About Creating a Trillion-Dollar Industry from Asteroid Mining for Precious Metals' Buisness Insider 
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Resource Exploration and Utilization Act of 2015 (the “U.S. Space Resource Act” or the “U.S. 
Act”) 2 to lay the foundation for the “authorization and continuing supervision” of space 
resource activities.3  Luxembourg followed suit with their own space resource activities 
legislation in 2017,4 and took the additional step of investing in space resource ventures such 
including Planetary Resources.5 There was a considerable response from the international 
community (or at least the segment that pays attention to such things), and the potential 
regulation of space resource utilization has featured as a topic at the United Nations Committee 
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space”s (“UNCOPUOS”) Legal Subcommittee for the last 
several years.6  It has also spawned at least one effort to draft a multilateral “framework” for 
space resource activities: The Hague International Space Resources Governance Working 
Group (the “Hague Working Group”).7  However, the space resources “bubble”8 may already 
have burst as both Deep Space Industries and Planetary Resources have been acquired by 
others9 and are no longer focused on space mining efforts. There are other companies pursing 
space resource activities, but a lot of the wind seems to have gone out of the sails of the 
industry.10 
This article explores our approach to the governance of space resource activities.  Part 
II looks at international space law relating to space resource activities.  Part III reviews the 
 
Australia (20 July) https://www.businessinsider.com.au/nasa-is-dreaming-about-creating-a-trillion-dollar-
industry-from-asteroid-mining-for-precious-metals-2015-7;  
Emily Calandrelli (2015) 'The Potential $100 Tirillion Market for Space Mining' TechChrunch (9 July) 
https://techcrunch.com/2015/07/09/the-potential-100-trillion-market-for-space-mining/; Jon Kelvey (2014) 'Is it 
Legal to Mine Asteroids' Slate (13 October) https://slate.com/technology/2014/10/asteroid-mining-and-space-
law-who-gets-to-profit-from-outer-space-platinum.html; Alan Boyle, Big-time Players are Getting Serious 
about Asteroid Perils and Profits, NBC NEWS (APR. 16, 2013), 
http://cosmiclog.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/04/16/17782885-big-time-players-are-getting-serious-about-
asteroid-perils-and-profits?lite 
2U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 114-90, §401, 129 Stat. 70 (2015) 
[hereinafter the U.S. Space Resource Act]. 
3
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, 
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies art.VI, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 
[hereinafter Outer Space Treaty]. 
4Loi 674 du 20 juillet 2017 sur l”exploration et l”utilisation des ressources de l”espace [Law 674 of July 20, 
2017 on the Exploration and Use of Space Resources], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DU GRAND-DUCHE DE LUX., 
July 28, 2017, http://legilux.public.lu/eli/eta1/leg/loi/2017/07/20/a674/jo [https://perma.cc/6XX4-
KCCE][hereinafter Luxembourg Space Resource Law].   
5See Sarah Scoles, Luxembourg”s Bid to Become the Silicon Valley of Space Mining, WIRED (Oct. 1, 2017),  
https://www.wired.com/2017/01/luxembourg-setting-silicon-valley-space-mining/; David Z. Morris, 
Luxembourg to Invest $227 Million in Asteroid Mining, FORTUNE (June 5, 2016), 
https://fortune.com/2016/06/05/luxembourg-asteroid-mining/. 
6See Comm. On the Peaceful uses of Outer Space, Rep. of the Legal Subcomm. on Its Fifty-Seventh 
Session, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/1177 (2018); Comm. On the Peaceful uses of Outer Space, Rep. of the Legal 
Subcomm. on Its Fifty-Sixth Session, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/1122 (2017); Comm. On the Peaceful uses of Outer 
Space, Rep. of the Legal Subcomm. on Its Fifty-Fifth Session, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/1113 (2016).   
7See Leiden University, THE HAGUE INTERNATIONAL SPACE RESOURCES GOVERNANCE WORKING GROUP, 
https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/en/law/institute-of-public-law/institute-for-air-space-law/the-hague-space-
resources-governance-working-group (last visited July 7, 2019).  The author is a member of this working group. 
8Jeff Foust, The Asteroid Mining Bubble Has Burst, THE SPACE REVIEW (Jan. 7, 2019), 
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/3633/1. 
9See Jeff Foust, Deep Space Industries Acquired by Bradford Space, SPACENEWS (Jan. 2, 2019),  
https://spacenews.com/deep-space-industries-acquired-by-bradford-space/; Jeff Foust, Asteroid Mining Company 
Planetary Resources Acquired by Blockchain Firm, SPACENEWS (Oct. 31, 2018),  
https://spacenews.com/asteroid-mining-company-planetary-resources-acquired-by-blockchain-firm/ 
10Moon Express - http://www.moonexpress.com/ and iSpace - https://ispace-inc.com/; see also: Chloe 
Cornish “Interplanetary Players: A Who”s Who of Space Mining” Financial Times (19 October 2017) Available 
at: https://www.ft.com/content/fb420788-72d1-11e7-93ff-99f383b09ff9 
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national legislation enacted by the U.S. and Luxembourg and the international reaction from 
both UNCOPOUS and the Hague Working Group.  Part IV considers the nature, form and need 
for a space resources property rights regime. This will include not only contemplating the 
“value” of property rights for the prospective industry but also the broader repercussions such 
as: the interests of all countries; sustainability; and potential impacts on the peace and stability 
of the international order. This article argues that an international space resources framework 
is necessary to ensure: 1) mutual recognition of property rights to extracted space resources as 
well as to avoid conflict and harmful interference; 2) that space resource activities do not 
unduly harm scientific, historical, cultural or aesthetic sites of interest on the Moon or other 
celestial bodies; and 3) sustainable, equitable access to space resources in the interests and for 
the benefit of all countries.  If the space resources bubble has indeed burst then now may be 
the time to slow down and reconsider the approach being taken to establish a legal regime to 
enable and supervise space resource activities.  The demise of Deep Space Industries and 
Planetary Resources will not be the end of the industry and the law and policy that has been 
developed will lay the foundation for future developments. 
 
 INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW 
 
The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use 
of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (the “Outer Space Treaty”) is 
commonly regarded as the “Magna Carta” of outer space.11 It has achieved widespread 
acceptance, having been ratified by 107 states and signed by an additional 23.12 Its key 
provisions are generally regarded as having achieved the status of customary international 
law,13 and it has been suggested that a few provisions, such as the non-appropriation principle 
found in Article II have achieved the status of jus cogens norms.14 There are several articles of 
the Outer Space Treaty that are relevant for space resource activities, however for this paper 
the three that are most relevant are Articles I, II and VI although a brief discussion of Article 
IX is also germane.15 It is also worth briefly discussing Article 11 of the Agreement Governing 
the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Moon Agreement).16 The 
Moon Agreement does not enjoy the same degree of support, having been ratified by only 18 
states but Article 11 discusses space resource activities and is therefore worth consideration.17 
 
11See Fabio Tronchetti, Legal Aspects of Space Resource Utilization, in HANDBOOK OF SPACE LAW, 778 
(Frans von der Dunk & Fabio Tronchetti eds., Edward Elgar 2015); FRANCIS LYALL & PAUL B. LARSEN, SPACE 
LAW: A TREATISE, 53 (Ashgate 2009)[hereinafter SPACE LAW: A TREATISE]; Stephan Hobe, Historical 
Background, in COLOGNE COMMENTARY ON SPACE LAW, VOL 1, 14 (Stephan Hobe, Bernhard Schmidt-Tedd & 
Kai-Uwe Schrogl eds., 1st ed, Carl Heymanns Verlag 2009)[hereinafter COLOGNE COMMENTARY]; I.H.PH. 
DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & V. KOPAL, AN INTRODUCTION TO SPACE LAW, 3 (3rd ed, Kluwer Law International 
2008).  
12Comm. On the Peaceful uses of Outer Space, Status of International Agreements Relating to Activities in 
Outer Space as at 1 January 2018, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/2018/CRP.3 (2018).  
13See Paul B. Larsen, Asteroid Legal Regime: Time for a Change?, 39 J. Space L. 275, 289 (2014); SPACE 
LAW: A TREATISE, supra note 12 at 54, 71, 180 & 184; Peter Malanczuk, AKEHURST”S MODERN INTRODUCTION 
TO INTERNATIONAL LAW, 206 (7th ed, Routledge 1997).  
14See Steven Freeland & Ram Jakhu, Article II in COLOGNE COMMENTARY, supra note 12 at 55; IMRE 
ANTHONY CSABAFI, THE CONCEPT OF STATE JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW: A STUDY IN THE 
PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT OF SPACE LAW IN THE UNITED NATIONS, 47 (Martinus Nijhoff 1971). 
15 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3. 
16Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, opened for signature 
Dec. 18, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Moon Agreement]. 
17Comm. On the Peaceful uses of Outer Space, Status of International Agreements Relating to Activities in 
Outer Space as at 1 January 2019, supra note 13. 
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Article I of the Outer Space Treaty declares that space is free for exploration and use 
by all States.18 There is no definition of the terms “exploration” or “use” in the Treaty, therefore 
under the rules of treaty interpretation, codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, the terms should be interpreted according to their “plain, ordinary meaning.”19 The 
ordinary meaning of a treaty term needs to be understood in context with the rest of the treaty 
and in line with the “object and purpose”20 of the treaty.  However, “plain meaning” is a good 
place to start,21 especially as textual analysis takes precedence.22 Recourse can be made to 
dictionaries – even specialist dictionaries – to find the “ordinary meaning,” and indeed courts 
have done so.23  
“Use” is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as “to take, hold or deploy as a 
means of achieving something” or “to take or consume (an amount) from a limited supply” 24 
which would imply that the plain, ordinary meaning of freedom of use of outer space includes 
the ability to mine asteroids and other celestial bodies for space resources.  The general 
principle in international law that anything that is not prohibited is permitted25 applies here. 
This connects to a ‘voluntarist’ interpretation of international law, in which States, as their own 
law makers are only bound by that which they have consented to be bound.26   There is no 
prohibition on resource extraction per se in the Outer Space Treaty, 27 therefore this principle 
combined with the above described plain ordinary meaning of the term “use” means that it is 
reasonable to argue that resource extraction is permitted, at least within the bounds of the rest 
of the space law regime. This argument is further strengthened by considering the “object and 
purpose” of the Outer Space Treaty.  The Treaty”s Preamble stipulates that the States Parties 
recognize “the common interest of all [hu]mankind in the progress of the exploration and use 
of outer space for peaceful purposes…”28  Quite simply, without space resource utilization 
activities, humanity”s “progress of the exploration and use of outer space” for whatever 
purposes will be limited. 
Article II of the Outer Space Treaty prohibits national appropriation by means of use, 
occupation, or any other means.29 While it is clear that this prohibits the acquisition of territory 
on the Moon or other celestial bodies there is debate about what it means for resources extracted 
 
18 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3 art. I. 
19Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), Jan. 27, 1155 UNTS 331 [hereinafter Vienna 
Convention]. 
20 Id. 
21RICHARD GARDINER, TREATY INTERPRETATION, 181, 184-5 (2nd ed, Oxford University Press 2017). 
22See Max H. Hulme, Preambles in Treaty Interpretation, 164 U. PA. L. Rev. 1281, 1297 (2016); Claire 
Brighton, Unravelling Reasonableness: A Question of Treaty Interpretation, 32 AUSTL. YEAR BOOK OF INT”L L. 
125, 125 (2014). 
23Gardiner, supra note 22, at 186-189. 
24Use, CONCISE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, 1593. 12th edition. 2011. 
25Jorg Kammerhofer (2009) ‘Gaps, The Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion and the 
Structure of International Legal Argument Between Theory and Practice’80 BYBIL 333, 
356-357; Helen Quane (2014) ‘Silence in International Law’ 84 BYBIL 240, 253-260; Carl 
Q. Christol Space Law: Past, Present, and Future (Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers 
1991), 290; (France v. Turkey) (1927) P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 10 (‘Lotus’ case), paras 46-47 
26Michael P. Scharf Customary International Law in Times of Fundamental Change: 
Recognizing Grotian Moments (Cambridge University Press 2013), 48-50; Bin Cheng, 
Studies In International Space Law (Clarendon Press, 1997), 138 
27That is to say that there is no specific provision that explicitly prohibits resource extraction, arguments 
that resource extraction is prohibited rest on the non-appropriation principle in Article II of the Outer Space 
Treaty. 
28 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, Preamble.  See generally Hulme, supra note 22, at 1299-1304. 
29 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, art. II. 
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from those bodies. There are those who argue that space resource utilization activities would 
violate Article II of the Outer Space Treaty as resources are part of the object in which they are 
found and to appropriate the resources would be to appropriate the celestial body, at least in 
part. 30   If resources are capable of being separated from the celestial body that they are found 
in, then it would not necessarily be a violation of Article II to appropriate the resource once it 
has been removed from that body.  It is just that the State in question would not acquire any 
territorial rights over the celestial body being mined. This is the argument that both the United 
States and Luxembourg have used in support of their national laws.31   
Article II does have significant implications for jurisdiction, as it prohibits territorial 
jurisdiction, the established basis for most jurisdictional claims.  Thus, States must rely almost 
exclusively on personal jurisdiction over their nationals in space, 32 as guided by Article VI of 
the Outer Space Treaty which requires that States authorize and supervise the activities of their 
nationals in outer space.33  As a result, many States have implemented national legislation to 
ensure that the activities of their nationals comply with the requirements of the Outer Space 
Treaty and international space law in general.  Even without Article VI of the Outer Space 
Treaty it is generally accepted in international law that “every State has the right to regulate 
the conduct of its subjects wherever they may be.”34 This is important.  States are free to 
regulate the activity of their nationals in outer space but they are not able to exercise jurisdiction 
over territory in outer space, this is a line that each of the U.S. and Luxembourg legislation 
manages to toe. 
Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty also warrants a brief mention as its provisions on 
the avoidance of ‘harmful interference’ and ‘harmful contamination’ are relevant for space 
resource activities and will needed to be further developed and defined as activities commence. 
The Article stipulates that: 
  
States Parties to the Treaty shall be guided by the “principle of co-operation and 
mutual assistance and shall conduct all their activities in outer space, including 
the moon and other celestial bodies, with due regard to the corresponding interests 
of all other States Parties to the Treaty.35 
 
30Ulrike M. Bohlmann, ‘Legal Aspects of the ‘Space Exploration Initiatives’’ in Marietta 
Benkö and Kai-Uwe Schrogl eds., Space Law: Current Problems and Perspective for Future 
Regulation (Eleven, 2005) 215-240, 224; Tronchetti, Fabio, ‘The Space Resource Exploration 
and Utilization Act: A Move Forward or a Step Back?’ (2015) 34 Space Policy 6, 7-8; 
Belgian Delegation, Statement made at UNCOPUOS Legal Subcommittee, 5 April 2016 
0928-0929 GMT - http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/audio/v2/meetings.jsp?lng=en; German 
Delegation – Statement Made at UNCOPUOS Legal Subcommittee – 29 March 2017 823-
906 GMT - http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/audio/v2/meetings.jsp?lng=en 
31Ministry of the Economy, Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, 'Explanatory Statement on the Draft Law on the 
Exploration and Use of Space Resources' (2016) https://gouvernement.lu/dam-
assets/fr/actualites/communiques/2016/11-novembre/11-presentation-spaceresources/Draft-law-space_press.pdf, 
1-6; US Delegation – UNCOPUOS Legal Subcommittee – 28 March 2017 855-903 GMT; US Delegation – 
UNCOPUOS Legal Subcommittee – 28 March 2017 1433-1441 GMT;  US Delegation – UNCOPUOS Legal 
Subcommittee – 29 March 2017 923-925 GMT; US Delegation – UNCOPUOS Legal Subcommittee – 29 
March 2017 1437-1457 GMT; Sagi Kfir, “Space Resources Utilisation and National Law: The Case of the 
USA’, Symposium on Legal Aspects of Space Resource Utilisation, 17 April 2016, Leiden Law School, 
Kamerlingh Onnes Building, Steenschuur 25, 2311ES Leiden 
32Csabafi, supra note 15, at 50-51. 
33Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, art. VI.  States also retain “jurisdiction and control” over their space 
objects, but that is less relevant for this paper. 
34Csabafi, supra note 15, at 51 
35 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, art. IX.   
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States also need to avoid the “harmful contamination” of the Moon and other celestial 
bodies and take steps to mitigate “harmful interference” with the activities of other States.  
Parties are to engage in “international consultations” in the event of conflict or potential 
conflict.36  “Harmful contamination” and “harmful interference” are not defined by the Outer 
Space Treaty, and have not enjoyed massive exploration in subsequent development beyond 
planetary protection principles37 and ITU rules, regulations, and guidelines.38  However, the 
concepts will be discussed further below and are relevant for discussions of space resource 
activities. 
 
The Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies39, 
or the Moon Agreement, largely mirrors the Outer Space Treaty, however the provisions of 
Article 11 develop, or attempt to develop, law on space resources and therefore warrants 
consideration. That said, the Moon Agreement only has only been ratified by 18 States40 
which has lead to it being regarded as a ‘failed’ treaty41, although it is an active treaty and 
binding on those states that are parties to it. Much of Article 1142 attempts to elaborate on the 
prohibition of national appropriation contained in Article II of the Outer Space.  The first 
section of Article 11 declares that “the Moon and its natural resources are the common 
heritage of [hu]mankind.”43 There is no explanation of what exactly this means. “Common 
heritage” is usually taken to be a stronger, more communal statement than the “province of 
all [hu]mankind” found in the Outer Space Treaty.44  However, it is a phrase which remains 
open to interpretation.  
 
36 Id. 
37COSPAR ‘COSPAR’s Planetary Protection Policy’ 
https://cosparhq.cnes.fr/sites/default/files/pppolicydecember_2017.pdf - Planetary protection principles are 
designed to prevent ‘forward contamination’ of celestial bodies with Earth organisms. 
38The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) is a specialised UN agency which, among other 
things, coordinates the use of radio frequencies in outer space in order to avoid interference with 
communications with and operation of space objects. See, Tanja Masson-Zwaan, ‘The International Framework 
for Space Activities’ in Christopher D. Johnson Handbook for New Actors In Space (Secure World Foundation 
2017), 17-21 
39Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies 
(adopted 18 December 1979, entered into force 11 July 1984) 1363 UNTS 3 (Moon 
Agreement) 
40UNCOPUOS ‘Status of International Agreements Relating to Activities in Outer Space as at 1 January 2019’ 
(1 April 2019) UN Doc A/AC.105/C.2/2019/CRP.3 
41Steven Freeland, ‘The Role of ‘Soft Law’ in Public International Law and its Relevance to 
the International Legal Regulation of Outer Space’ in Irmgard Marboe (eds), Soft Law in 
Outer Space: The Function of Non-binding Norms in International Space Law (Boehlau 
Verlag, 2012), 9-30, 17-18; Glenn H. Reynolds and Robert P. Merges, Outer Space: 
Problems of Law and Policy (2nd edn. Westview 1997), 116 
42 Moon Agreement supra note 17, art. 11. 
43 Id.  
44Stephan Hobe ‘Article 1’ in Stephan Hobe, Bernhard Schmidt-Tedd and Kai-Uwe Schrogl eds., Cologne 
Commentary on Space Law, vol 1 (1st edn, Carl Heymanns Verlag, 2009), 27-29; Dr. Ram Jakhu, Freeland, 
Hobe and Tronchetti ‘Article 11 (Common Heritage of Mankind/International Regime) in Stephan Hobe, 
Bernhard Schmidt-Tedd, Kai-Uwe Schrogl and Peter Stubbe eds., Cologne Commentary on Space Law, vol 2 
(1st edn, Carl Heymanns Verlag, 2013), 392-395; Fabio Tronchetti Fundamentals of Space Law and Policy 
(Springer 2013) 13-14; Yoshifumi Tanaka The International Law of the Sea (2nd edn. Cambridge University 
Press 2015), 16-19; Frans von der Dunk, ‘International Space Law’ in Frans von der Dunk and Fabio Tronchetti 
eds., Handbook of Space Law (Edward Elgar, 2015), 57-58 
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Section 5 of Article 11 calls for the establishment of an international regime to govern 
the “exploitation of the natural resources of the Moon as such exploitation is about to become 
feasible.”45 Granted, it does specify the Moon, but there is no reason the international regime 
could not be extended to cover all celestial bodies. Section 6 calls for State Parties to inform 
the United Nations Secretary General and the international scientific community of any 
resources they discover.46 This could have implications for commercial confidentiality.  
Nevertheless, terrestrial resource extraction will necessarily involve disclosure of the proposed 
site of operations so steps can be taken to protect the rights of the discoverer.   
Section 7(d) calls for an equitable sharing of the benefits of the resources of the Moon.47 
This is one of the features that causes much of the opposition to the Moon Agreement,48 
however it is worth noting that equitable does not mean equal, it essentially means fair.  In 
total, Article 11 of the Moon Agreement would provide a mechanism for providing legal 
certainty vis-a-vis space resources.   
Even so, it is worth bearing in mind, especially as it remains relevant for those States 
that are parties to the Moon Agreement.  State Parties to the Moon Agreement have an 
obligation to establish an international regime when space resource activities become feasible, 
which could potentially have implications for the unity of space law which will be discussed 
further below (and is another reason why despite the “failure” of the Moon Agreement it cannot 
simply be ignored.) 
 
  NATIONAL SPACE RESOURCE UTILIZATION LEGISLATION 
 
A. The United States 
 
The U.S. Space Resource Act49 was enacted to enable the U.S. to develop a framework for 
regulating space resource activities.50  The U.S. Space Resources Act declares that US 
citizens or entities  
 
“engaged in commercial recovery of an asteroid resource or a space resource… 
shall be entitled to any asteroid resource or space resource obtained, including 
to possess, own, transport, use, and sell the asteroid resource or space resource 
obtained in accordance with applicable law, including the international 
obligations of the United States.’’.51 
 
 
45 Moon Agreement supra note 17, art. 11. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48Peter Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law (7th edn, Routledge 
1997), 206; Glenn H. Reynolds and Robert P. Merges, Outer Space: Problems of Law and 
Policy (2nd edn. Westview 1997), 114 
49 See U.S. Space Resource Act, supra note 2. 
50Committee on Science, Space and Technology, US House of Representatives ‘Report together with 
Minority Views on Spurring Private Aerospace Competitiveness and Entrepreneurship Act of 2015’ (Report 
114-119, 2015) https://www.congress.gov/114/crpt/hrpt119/CRPT-114hrpt119.pdf page 9 
51U.S. Space Resource Act, supra note 2, §51303 
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It also provides definitions for the term asteroid resource which “means a space resource found 
on or within a single asteroid.”52 As well as ‘space resource’ which is “an abiotic resource in 
situ in outer space.”53 This includes water and minerals.54 
 
The legislation should be seen as an illustration of the U.S. understanding of its obligations to 
“authorise and supervise” the activities of its nationals in outer space as stipulated by Article 
VI of the Outer Space Treaty. The U.S. Act has provoked controversy55 as it arguably 
conflicts with Article II of the Outer Space Treaty which prohibits national appropriation of 
outer space, the Moon, and any other celestial body by “claim of sovereignty, by means of 
use or occupation, or by any other means.”56 The conflict argument essentially avers that 
under the U.S. Act the U.S. grants itself the right to grant property rights over space resources 
to U.S. companies.  As such, the legislation could be seen as an attempt by the U.S. to claim 
jurisdiction over space resources, and by extension, the bodies they are found in.57 
The U.S. Act does require the “accordance with the international obligations of the 
United States”58 and makes the disclaimer that “the United States does not thereby assert 
sovereignty or sovereign or exclusive rights or jurisdiction over, or the ownership of, any 
celestial body.”59 However, some legal scholars, including Fabio Tronchetti, are skeptical of 
the value of such assurances claiming that:  
 
references to “consistency with international obligations” are vaguely phrased 
and such a consistency is to be evaluated from a national, US, perspective, 
which may not be shared, or agreed to, by other States Parties to the UN space 
treaties.60 
 
There is also an issue regarding enforcement. The U.S. Act only applies to citizens of 
the U.S. or U.S. companies, and clarifies that it is not intended to extend U.S. jurisdiction to 
any celestial body.61 Ownership of space resources against foreign nationals or corporations 
may prove challenging -- especially if such States were to take the view that the act is an 
illegitimate act of U.S. unilateralism in space, a view which has been expressed at 
UNCOPUOS62 – as the Act explicitly narrows it scope to persons under US jurisdiction.63 This 
reduces the effectiveness of the act considerably.  Enforceability issues are further complicated 
 
52U.S. Space Resource Act, supra note 2, §51301(1)  
53U.S. Space Resource Act, supra note 2, §51301(2)(a) 
54U.S. Space Resource Act, supra note 2, §51301(2)(b) 
55Gbenga Oduntan 'Who Owns Space? US Asteroid-Mining Act is Dangerous and Potentially Illegal' The 
Conversation (25 November 2015) Available at: https://theconversation.com/who-owns-space-us-asteroid-
mining-act-is-dangerous-and-potentially-illegal-51073; 'US Space-Mining Law Seen Leading to Possible Treaty 
Violations' CBC News (26 November 2015) Available at: http://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/space-mining-us-
treaty-1.3339104; Russian Delegation, Statement at UNCOPUOS Legal Subcommittee, 4 April 2016 0952-0955 
GMT; Russian Delegation, Statement at UNCOPUOS Legal Subcommittee, 5 April 2016 1004-1014 GMT; 
Belgian Delegation, Statement at UNCOPUOS Legal Subcommittee, 5 April 2016 0906-0908 GMT; Belgian 
Delegation, Statement at UNCOPUOS Legal Subcommittee, 5 April 2016 0928-0929 GMT  
56 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, at art. II. 
57Fabio Tronchetti, The Space Resource Exploration and Utilization Act: A Move Forward or a Step Back?,  
34 SPACE POLICY 6, 8 (2015). 
58U.S. Space Resource Act, supra note 2, § 51302(a)(2) and (a)(3). 
59Id. at § 403 
60Tronchetti, supra note 51, at 7. 
61U.S. Space Resource Act, supra note 2, Sec. 403. 
62Russian Delegation, UNCOPUOS Legal Subcommittee, 4 April 2016 0952-0955 GMT; Belgian Delegation, 
UNCOPUOS Legal Subcommittee, 5 April 2016 0906-0908 GMT 
63U.S. Space Resource Act, supra note 2, Sec. 403. 
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by the lack of any dispute resolution mechanisms specifically in the Outer Space Treaty64 at 
least beyond the existing international institutions such as the International Court of Justice. 
However the strength of these mechanism is reasonably questionable, particularly as the 
international rules based comes under increasing threat. China rejected the outcome of the 
South China Sea case65 and Britain looks set to do the same regarding the Chagos Islands.66 As 
will be discussed in further detail below, enforcement is key to the effectiveness of a property 
rights regime, so this may be a particular problem, especially if the “national” approach is the 
dominant model taken to regulating space resource activities. 
Nevertheless, national legislation is necessary, as part of the Article VI obligation to 
“authorise and supervise,” and therefore pointing out these inadequacies is not an attack on 
national legislation in and of itself but rather an argument for embedding national legislation 
in some sort of international framework to, at the very least, ensure mutual recognition, 
facilitate cooperation and the avoid harmful interference.  Furthermore, the development of 
national legislation allows for experimentation in the regulation of space resource activities 
and the development of a property rights regime, which is important given the novelty of space 
resource activities.  As such, it is premature to expect uniformity. While the second national 
legislation on space resource activities is in principle similar to that of the U.S., Luxembourg 
has nevertheless provided the world with a second “model” for space resource legislation.  
 
B. Luxembourg 
 
Luxembourg”s Law on the Exploration and Use of Space Resources (“Luxembourg 
Space Resource Law” or the “Luxembourg Law”) came into effect on August 1, 2017.67 The 
country first published a draft version of this law in November 2016.68 Luxembourg has 
embraced space resource activities from an economic standpoint, as in addition to this law they 
have also invested over 200 million Euros in the industry.69  
Article I declares that “space resources are capable of being appropriated.”70 Although 
it is notable that unlike its U.S. counterpart,71 the Luxembourg Space Resource Law does not 
provide a definition of space resources.  However, the explanatory document published with 
the initial draft of the Luxembourg Law took the definition established in the U.S. Act to be 
 
64Fabio Tronchetti Fundamentals of Space Law and Policy (Springer 2013), 47-50; Stewart Patrick 
(2014) ‘The Unruled World: The Case for Good Enough Global Governance’ 93 Foreign Affairs 58, 70 
65https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/12/philippines-wins-south-china-sea-case-against-china 
66https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/may/01/corbyn-condemns-mays-defiance-of-chagos-islands-ruling 
67Loi 674 du 20 juillet 2017 sur l”exploration et l”utilisation des ressources de l”espace [Law 674 of July 
20, 2017 on the Exploration and Use of Space Resources], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DU GRAND-DUCHE DE 
LUX., July 28, 2017, http://legilux.public.lu/eli/eta1/leg/loi/2017/07/20/a674/jo [https://perma.cc/6XX4-
KCCE][hereinafter Luxembourg Space Resource Law]; 
https://spaceresources.public.lu/en/actualites/2017/Luxembourg-is-the-first-European-nation-to-offer-a-legal-
framework-for-space-resources-utilization.html 
68https://gouvernement.lu/dam-assets/fr/actualites/communiques/2016/11-novembre/11-presentation-
spaceresources/Draft-law-space_press.pdf 
69See Sarah Scoles, Luxembourg”s Bid to Become the Silicon Valley of Space Mining, WIRED (Oct. 1, 2017),  
https://www.wired.com/2017/01/luxembourg-setting-silicon-valley-space-mining/; David Z. Morris, 
Luxembourg to Invest $227 Million in Asteroid Mining, FORTUNE (June 5, 2016), 
https://fortune.com/2016/06/05/luxembourg-asteroid-mining/. 
70Loi 674 du 20 juillet 2017 sur l”exploration et l”utilisation des ressources de l”espace [Law 674 of July 
20, 2017 on the Exploration and Use of Space Resources], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DU GRAND-DUCHE DE 
LUX., July 28, 2017, http://legilux.public.lu/eli/eta1/leg/loi/2017/07/20/a674/jo [https://perma.cc/6XX4-
KCCE][hereinafter Luxembourg Space Resource Law]; 
https://spaceresources.public.lu/en/actualites/2017/Luxembourg-is-the-first-European-nation-to-offer-a-legal-
framework-for-space-resources-utilization.html 
71U.S. Space Resource Act, supra note 2, §51301(1),(2) 
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the “common definition.”72 This definition is that a space resource is an abiotic resource that 
can be found in situ in outer space including water and minerals.73 It is worth noting that this 
is the definition adopted by the Hague Working Group”s Draft Building Blocks for an 
International Framework on Space Resources.74  The U.S. Act also uses the term “asteroid 
resource,” but the definition of that, as yet, is no different from space resource except for the 
fact that an asteroid resource is found in an asteroid.75 
 
Luxembourg’ Space Resources Law lays out a licencing process for prospective space 
resource companies to receive approval from the Luxembourg government.  The license itself 
can only be granted to legal persons (i.e. companies) having its registered office in 
Luxembourg.76 A license is non-transferable77 and needs to be used within 36 months of being 
granted78 (presumably this just means operations need to have started within 36 months). 
Furthermore, in order to obtain a license, the applicant must demonstrate, among other things, 
a “robust scheme of financial, technical, and statutory procedures…” and plans for the 
exploration, utilization and commercialization phases of operations.79 Key sections of the 
Luxembourg Law are backed up by criminal penalties, which range from fines of varying 
degrees and can include a prison term of between eight days and five years depending on which 
sections of the Law have been infringed.80 
When the U.S. Act was enacted in November 2015 it caused quite a stir. There were a 
number of commentators who declared it to be incompatible with the U.S.” international 
 
72https://gouvernement.lu/dam-assets/fr/actualites/communiques/2016/11-novembre/11-presentation-
spaceresources/Draft-law-space_press.pdf, 1; See also US Space Resources Act §51301(1) and (2) as well as 
The Hague Space Resources Governance Working Group (2017) “Draft Building Blocks for the Development 
of an International Framework on Space Resource Activities” Available at: 
https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/binaries/content/assets/rechtsgeleerdheid/instituut-voor-publiekrecht/lucht--en-
ruimterecht/space-resources/draft-building-blocks.pdf Building Block 2.1 
73https://gouvernement.lu/dam-assets/fr/actualites/communiques/2016/11-novembre/11-presentation-
spaceresources/Draft-law-space_press.pdf, 1 
74The Hague Space Resources Governance Working Group (2017) “Draft Building Blocks for the 
Development of an International Framework on Space Resource Activities” Available at: 
https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/binaries/content/assets/rechtsgeleerdheid/instituut-voor-publiekrecht/lucht--en-
ruimterecht/space-resources/draft-building-blocks.pdf 
75US Space Resources Act §51301(1) and (2) 
76Loi 674 du 20 juillet 2017 sur l”exploration et l”utilisation des ressources de l”espace [Law 674 of July 
20, 2017 on the Exploration and Use of Space Resources], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DU GRAND-DUCHE DE 
LUX., July 28, 2017, http://legilux.public.lu/eli/eta1/leg/loi/2017/07/20/a674/jo [https://perma.cc/6XX4-
KCCE][hereinafter Luxembourg Space Resource Law], Article 4 
77Loi 674 du 20 juillet 2017 sur l”exploration et l”utilisation des ressources de l”espace [Law 674 of July 20, 
2017 on the Exploration and Use of Space Resources], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DU GRAND-DUCHE DE LUX., 
July 28, 2017, http://legilux.public.lu/eli/eta1/leg/loi/2017/07/20/a674/jo [https://perma.cc/6XX4-
KCCE][hereinafter Luxembourg Space Resource Law], Article 5 
78Loi 674 du 20 juillet 2017 sur l”exploration et l”utilisation des ressources de l”espace [Law 674 of July 20, 
2017 on the Exploration and Use of Space Resources], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DU GRAND-DUCHE DE LUX., 
July 28, 2017, http://legilux.public.lu/eli/eta1/leg/loi/2017/07/20/a674/jo [https://perma.cc/6XX4-
KCCE][hereinafter Luxembourg Space Resource Law], Article 14(2) 
79Loi 674 du 20 juillet 2017 sur l”exploration et l”utilisation des ressources de l”espace [Law 674 of July 
20, 2017 on the Exploration and Use of Space Resources], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DU GRAND-DUCHE DE 
LUX., July 28, 2017, http://legilux.public.lu/eli/eta1/leg/loi/2017/07/20/a674/jo [https://perma.cc/6XX4-
KCCE][hereinafter Luxembourg Space Resource Law], Article 7-10 
80Loi 674 du 20 juillet 2017 sur l”exploration et l”utilisation des ressources de l”espace [Law 674 of July 
20, 2017 on the Exploration and Use of Space Resources], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DU GRAND-DUCHE DE 
LUX., July 28, 2017, http://legilux.public.lu/eli/eta1/leg/loi/2017/07/20/a674/jo [https://perma.cc/6XX4-
KCCE][hereinafter Luxembourg Space Resource Law], Article 18 
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obligations, arising primarily from the Article II of Outer Space Treaty.81 At the Legal 
Subcommittee of COPUOS in 2016 and again in 2017 a number of states expressed their 
concern about the unilateral nature of the US law.82 There has not been the same degree of 
reaction to Luxembourg”s space resource activities law. There are presumably two reasons 
for this: one, it is not unprecedented any more; and two, Luxembourg naturally attracts less 
notice than the United States. That a second state has joined the United States in enacting 
legislation regulating space resource activities certainly strengthens the case that it is a valid 
interpretation of the Outer Space Treaty (as the International Institute of Space Law asserted 
in a position paper released by their board),83 yet the international legal situation is still 
developing and will presumably continue to do so for some time yet. 
 
 INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE 
 
A. UNCOPUOS 
  
UNCOPUOS is the United Nation body primarily responsible for space governance.  It 
has been active since 1959 in one form or another. There are two subcommittees, the Scientific 
and Technical Subcommittee and the Legal Subcommittee which report to the full Committee 
which itself reports to the Fourth Committee of the UN General Assembly.84 UNCOPUOS has 
been the source of all five space law treaties, as well as a host of resolutions.  
 
Space resource utilization was on the agenda for the Legal Subcommittee in 201885 and 
201786, although it was also previously discussed at the 2016 session in the wake of the US 
space resource activities legislation.87  As should probably be expected space resource activities 
were a popular and controversial topic at UNCOPUOS.  There was quite a bit of concern 
expressed by a number of states at the “unilateral” nature of the U.S. Act,88, and Luxembourg’s, 
then proposed, space resource activities law.89  The concerned States voiced the view that space 
resource activities either can only or should be authorised by a multilateral international legal 
regime.90 The US and Luxembourg contended that they were merely upholding their 
 
81See Gbenga Oduntan, Who Owns Space? US Asteroid-Mining Act is Dangerous and Potentially Illegal, 
THE CONVERSATION (Nov. 25, 2015), https://theconversation.com/who-owns-space-us-asteroid-mining-act-is-
dangerous-and-potentially-illegal-51073; US Space-Mining Law Seen Leading to Possible Treaty Violations, 
CBC NEWS (Nov. 26, 2015), http://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/space-mining-us-treaty-1.3339104. 
82UNCOPUOS, “Report of the Legal Subcommittee on its Fifty-Sixth session” (Vienna 18 April 2017) UN 
Doc A/AC.105/1122, 31-33; UNCOPUOS, “Report of the Legal Subcommittee on its Fifty-Fifth session” (Vienna 
27 April 2016) UN Doc A/AC.105/1113, 13 
83International Institute of Space Law (2015) Position Paper on Space Mining Available at: 
http://www.iislweb.org/docs/SpaceResourceMining.pdf (Accessed 28 January 2017)  
84http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/copuos/comm-subcomms.html; https://www.un.org/en/ga/fourth/ 
85A/AC.105/C.2/L.303, item 15 
86A/AC.105/C.2/L.299, item 14  
87
A/AC.105/1113, 13-14 
88
A/AC.105/1113, para 74-75, page 13 
89A/AC.105/1113, para 74-75, page 13 
90Belgian Delegation – UNCOPUOS Legal Subcommittee – 28 March 2017 1421-1429 (GMT); Chinese 
Delegation – UNCOPUOS Legal Subcommittee – 28 March 2017 932-946 GMT; German Delegation – 
UNCOPUOS Legal Subcommittee – 29 March 2017 823-906 GMT; Austria – UNCOPUOS Legal 
Subcommittee – 29 March 906-910 GMT; France – UNCOPUOS Legal Subcommittee  -28 March 2017 1429-
1432 GMT; Austria - UNCOPUOS Legal Subcommittee - 13 April 2018 858-903 GMT; China - UNCOPUOS 
Legal Subcommittee - 13 April 2018 1340-1347 GMT; China - UNCOPUOS Legal Subcommittee - 5 April 
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obligations under Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty to “authorise and supervise” space 
activities conducted by their nationals and that the widely permissive nature of the Outer Space 
Treaty allows for space resource activities.91 There was also considerable discussion of what 
exactly constitutes national appropriation and whether you can separate a resource from the 
celestial body it is found in.92 This discussion was aided by, and to some degree took place 
during, the European Centre for Space Law/International Institute of Space Law (ECSL/IISL) 
symposium that took place on the afternoon the of the first Monday during the session.93 
Beyond the legal questions of space resource activities there were also concerns about 
the equity of it.  Developing states in particular are concerned that once again they will miss 
out on a mineral “bonanza” that will only exacerbate the divide between developed and 
developing states.94  Discussion of this topic centres on the notion that space, and its resources, 
is a global common interest that belongs to all of humanity, or in the language of the outer 
space treaty, that space is the “province of all mankind” and should be used in the interest and 
for the benefit of all States.95 However, there is, and has been for some time, growing 
acceptance that the meaning of “for the benefit” and “in the interests” of all and the phrase 
“province of all mankind” which are included in the Outer Space Treaty, can have broader, less 
concrete meanings.  
One thing that has developed over the past several years of discussions at UNCOPUOS 
is a growing acceptance, although perhaps not yet consensus, that space resource activities are 
permitted under international space law.96 Granted, there are still debates as to how to authorise 
space resource activities, and whether national legislation under existing international law is 
sufficient.  Nevertheless, the principle that space resource activities is a permitted “use” of 
outer space, albeit subject to the provisions of Article II of the Outer Space Treaty and the rest 
of international space law, has gained considerable ground. 
 
 
2019 853-856 GMT; France - UNCOPUOS Legal Subcommittee - 5 April 2019 902-903 GMT; Austria - 
UNCOPUOS Legal Subcommittee - 8 April 2019 843-846 GMT; Germany - UNCOPUOS Legal Subcommittee 
- 5 April 2019 829-833 GMT 
91US Delegation, UNCOPUOS Legal Subcommittee, 5 April 2016 1116-1123; Luxembourg – UNCOPUOS 
Legal Subcommittee – 28 March 2017 1416-1420 GMT; US Delegation – UNCOPUOS Legal Subcommittee – 
28 March 2017 855-903 GMT;US Delegation – UNCOPUOS Legal Subcommittee – 28 March 2017 1433-1441 
GMT;US Delegation – UNCOPUOS Legal Subcommittee – 29 March 2017 923-925 GMT; Luxembourg – 
UNCOPUOS Legal Subcommittee – 10 April 2018 1343-1344; Luxembourg – UNCOPUOS Legal 
Subcommittee – 13 April 2018 906-912; United States – UNCOPUOS Legal Subcommittee – 10 April 2018 
1328-1329; United States – UNCOPUOS Legal Subcommittee – 13 April 2018 1336-1337; Luxembourg – 
UNCOPUOS Legal Subcommittee – 5 April 2019 1347-1351 
92Belgian Delegation, UNCOPUOS Legal Subcommittee, 5 April 2016 1028-1029; German Delegation – 
UNCOPUOS Legal Subcommittee – 29 March 2017 823-906 GMT; Austria – UNCOPUOS Legal 
Subcommittee – 29 March 906-910 GMT; US Delegation – UNCOPUOS Legal Subcommittee – 28 March 
2017 1433-1441 GMT; Germany – UNCOPUOS Legal Subcommittee – 13 April 2018 853-854 GMT; Austria 
13 April 2018 858-903; Colombia – UNCOPUOS Legal Subcommittee – 5 April 2019 1344-1345  
93See http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/copuos/lsc/2017/symposium.html 
94Chinese Delegation – UNCOPUOS Legal Subcommittee – 28 March 2017 932-946 GMT; Sudan Delegation – 
UNCOPUOS Legal Subcommittee – 28 March 2017 1347-1350 GMT; Morocco Delegation – UNCOPUOS 
Legal Subcommittee – 29 March 2017 1420-1421 GMT; Cuba Delegation – UNCOPUOS Legal Subcommittee 
– 31 March 2017 837-838 GMT; Group of 77 and China  – UNCOPUOS Legal Subcommittee – 13 April 2018 
841-842 GMT 
95Chinese Delegation – UNCOPUOS Legal Subcommittee – 28 March 2017 932-946 GMT; Sudan Delegation – 
UNCOPUOS Legal Subcommittee – 28 March 2017 1347-1350 GMT; Morocco Delegation – UNCOPUOS 
Legal Subcommittee – 29 March 2017 1420-1421 GMT; Cuba Delegation – UNCOPUOS Legal Subcommittee 
– 31 March 2017 837-838 GMT; Group of 77 and China – UNCOPUOS Legal Subcommittee –  13 April 2018 
841-842 GMT 
96UN Doc A/AC.105/1203, 32-36; UN Doc A/AC.105/1177, 29-33; UN Doc A/AC.105/1122, 30-33; UN Doc 
A/AC.105/1113, 13-14 
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B. The Hague International Space Resources Governance Working Group 
 
The Hague Working Group was formed in response to the developments in the field of 
space resource utilization. There was a recognition that “in the absence of a clear framework 
to govern these activities, there is a need to examine the concepts that are being discussed…”97 
The Hague Working Group released their Draft Building Blocks for the Development of an 
International Framework on Space Resource Activities (the “Building Blocks”)  in September 
2017 and continues to work on them.98  
The Working Group has adopted the same definition of space resource as is found in 
the U.S. Act and was used in the explanatory document that accompanied the Luxembourg 
Law. This demonstrates a growing acceptance of a “standard” definition of a space resource as 
an abiotic resource in situ in outer space. The primary concern of the draft building blocks is 
promotion of “international cooperation and multi-stakeholder dialogue.”99 The Building 
Blocks focus on key principles or attributes that any international framework should consider, 
without taking any view as to the particularities of the framework itself. The Hague Working 
Group has not been established or authorised by UNCOPUOS but is formed of a group of 
experts, industry partners and other stakeholders with an interest in promoting the development 
of an international framework on space resource activities.100 Rather than delve into detail of 
the specific building blocks here reference will be made to relevant elements when suitable.  
 
 A GOLD RUSH IN SPACE? 
 
An initial survey of the resources of the solar system makes a compelling case for space 
mining, or extra-terrestrial resource utilization. It is clear that there are substantial quantities of 
precious, valuable, and useful metals in asteroids as well as abundant quantities of water, 
mostly in the form of ice, on asteroids, comets, planets, and moons. For example, it has been 
suggested that Amun, a fairly small Near-Earth Object (“NEO”) with a mass of approximately 
30 billion tons, contains approximately $8,000 billion in iron and nickel, $6,000 billion in 
cobalt and $8,000 billion in platinum group metals.101 Similar estimates have projected that the 
asteroid belt also contains about four billion tons of uranium.102 Whilst the Moon and other 
planets may have even more lucrative resources, asteroids, and in particular NEOs, have the 
added lure of being “the most easily reachable bodies within the entire solar system.”103 There 
 
97International Institute of Air and Space Law (2017) ‘The Hague Space Resources Governance Working Group’ 
Available at: https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/en/law/institute-of-public-law/institute-for-air-space-law/the-
hague-space-resources-governance-working-group 
98The Hague Space Resources Governance Working Group (2017) ‘Draft Building Blocks for the Development 
of an International Framework on Space Resource Activities’ Available at: 
https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/binaries/content/assets/rechtsgeleerdheid/instituut-voor-publiekrecht/lucht--en-
ruimterecht/space-resources/draft-building-blocks.pdf 
99The Hague Space Resources Governance Working Group (2017) ‘Draft Building Blocks for the Development 
of an International Framework on Space Resource Activities’ Available at: 
https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/binaries/content/assets/rechtsgeleerdheid/instituut-voor-publiekrecht/lucht--en-
ruimterecht/space-resources/draft-building-blocks.pdf, introduction (para 1) 
100https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/binaries/content/assets/rechtsgeleerdheid/instituut-voor-
publiekrecht/lucht--en-ruimterecht/space-resources/final-report_the-hague-space-resources-governance-
working-group-7-6-18.pdf, 1-5 
101 JOHN S. LEWIS, MINING THE SKY: UNTOLD RICHES FROM THE ASTEROIDS, COMETS AND PLANETS, 112 
(Helix Books, 1997). 
102Id. at 193, 197. 
103M. DI MARTINO, ET AL., THE ASTEROID HAZARD: EVALUATING AND AVOIDING THE THREAT OF ASTEROID 
IMPACTS, 195 (1st ed., European Space Agency 2009). 
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are estimated to be 20,000 NEOs larger than 100m diameter, all capable of being mined in the 
near future, given sufficient investment.104 
As well as their relative convenience and abundance of minerals, another aspect of 
asteroids and NEOs that makes them attractive propositions for resource activity ventures is 
the potential to utilize water which is present on such bodies.105 Water is a valuable commodity 
in space; it can be used for drinking, bathing and cleaning but it can also be used to make air 
and rocket fuel. As it costs $20,000 to put a typical 500ml bottle of water into orbit it would be 
vastly more efficient and cost effective to use a space-based source of water rather than rely on 
a supply from Earth.106 Asteroid mining for water ice is technologically feasible and would be 
achievable using established technology.107  
The production of fuel in space would be a game changer for the development of the 
solar system, reducing the cost of access to space dramatically. One industry, on-orbit 
servicing, is, much like the space resource activities sector, a developing and embryonic 
industry which would also greatly benefit from a comparatively cheap source of fuel.108 
Additionally, established space companies such as the United Launch Alliance have indicated 
that they would be willing to pay $3,000 for a kilogram of propellant delivered to Low Earth 
Orbit.109 This projection fits well with the assessment made by John S. Lewis, that payload 
delivered to Earth orbit for less than $10,000 per kilogram would be competitive with Earth 
launched material.110 In the future, it is not difficult to envisage the creation of a series of space-
based filling stations processing locally sourced water and facilitating travel into the solar 
system.  
The Moon is also attracting considerable attention. Moon Express, Inc. (Moon Express) 
and iSpace, inc. (iSpace)  are both companies that are exploring the development of technology 
capable of exploiting lunar resources.111 Despite talk of mining the Moon for Helium-3 the 
main focus, as with asteroids is water ice. This is especially the case if the resources were in 
support of a manufacturing or servicing industry in low earth orbit, supporting lunar bases 
and/or a developing cis-lunar economy.112 At present, such discussions may seem somewhat 
far-fetched, yet the proposals for a Moon Village from the European Space Agency113 and 
commercial “space hotels” from Bigelow Aerospace114 illustrate that such ideas could soon 
 
104Martin Elvis, Prospecting Asteroid Resources in VIOREL BADESCU, ED., ASTEROIDS: PROSPECTIVE 
ENERGY AND MATERIAL RESOURCES, 81 (Springer 2013). 
105See JOHN S. LEWIS ASTEROID MINING 101: WEALTH FOR THE NEW SPACE ECONOMY, 107-113 (Deep Space 
Industries 2015); MICHAEL K. SHEPARD ASTEROIDS: RELICS OF ANCIENT TIME, 308-9 (Cambridge University 
Press 2015). 
106Shepard, supra note 93 at 308-9. 
107John S. Lewis, Tapping the Waters of Space 10 SCI. AM. PRESENTS 100, 103 (1999). 
108Caleb Henry, Airbus to Challenge SSL, Orbital ATK with New Space Tug Business, SPACENEWS (Sep. 28, 
2017), https://spacenews.com/airbus-to-challenge-ssl-orbital-atk-with-new-space-tug-
business/?utm_content=buffer46444&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer. 
109Leonard David, Inside ULA”s Plan to Have 1,000 People Working in Space by 2045, SPACE.COM (June 
29, 2016), https://www.space.com/33297-satellite-refueling-business-proposal-ula.html 
110Lewis, supra note 93 at 113.  
111Chloe Cornish “Interplanetary Players: A Who”s Who of Space Mining” Financial Times (19 October 
2017) Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/fb420788-72d1-11e7-93ff-99f383b09ff9; Loren Grush, “No One 
Won the Google Lunar X Prize, but These Competitors are Still Shooting for the Moon’ The Verge (31  March 
20180 Available at: https://www.theverge.com/2018/3/31/17176530/google-lunar-x-prize-competition-spaceil-
moon-express-astrobotic  
112Leonard David, Is Moon Mining Economically Feasible?, SPACE.COM (Jan. 7, 2015), 
https://www.space.com/28189-moon-mining-economic-feasibility.html 
113Jan Woerner Moon Village: A Vision for Global Cooperation and Space 4.0, European Space Agency 
Ministerial Council 2016, available at: http://m.esa.int/About_Us/Ministerial_Council_2016/Moon_Village. 
114Dinah Eng, Robert Bigelow is Building Hotels in Space (No, Really), FORTUNE (May 19, 2016), 
http://fortune.com/2016/05/19/robert-bigelow-hotels-space/. 
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emerge as serious propositions. It is even now evident that Mars has “large quantities of nearly 
pure water ice at the surface of Mars that is concentrated in huge debris-covered glaciers”115 
which would enable the support of surface operations and eventually settlement. 
 
It was this potential bonanza that prompted the formation of Planetary Resources and 
Deep Space Industries. They announced their intentions to commence commercial asteroid 
resource activities within the near future in April 2012 and January 2013, respectively.116 This 
kicked off the most recent space mining “boom,”117 however, this was not the first time plans 
to mine asteroids have been announced, nor is it the first time that it has been suggested that 
space resource activities are on the verge of becoming a reality. Jim Benson’s SpaceDev 
announced in the 1990s that it intended to begin commercial asteroid mining; however, nothing 
ultimately came of that endeavour.118 Additionally, Fabio Tronchetti asserts that one of the 
main motivations for the drafting of the Moon Agreement was the concern about the imminent 
prospect of lunar mining.119 Suffice it to say no mining of the Moon has yet occurred.  
While it is easy to claim that the same failure has happened again, as both Planetary 
Resources and Deep Space Industries have been acquired by others and have, at the very least, 
shelved plans for asteroid mining,120 the U.S. Space Resource Act has changed the playing 
field.  It is no longer particularly relevant whether space resource activities are an imminently 
viable industry or on the cusp of initiating commercial resource activity operations. As there 
are now two States with national legislation addressing space resource activities, it is 
reasonable to expect others to follow. The U.S and Luxembourg laws are likely to serve as 
templates, in whole or in part, for other national legislation. Furthermore, there is potential for 
these laws to provoke the development of customary international law regarding space resource 
activities. Therefore, regardless of the actual viability of the embryonic space resource 
utilization industry the legal regulation of the industry does need to be discussed. Finally, as 
noted above, companies like iSpace, among others, continue to actively pursue Lunar resource 
activities and there are, and may yet be more to come, new entrants to the market, such as UK 
based Asteroid Mining Corporation Limited.121 These companies have the stepping stone of an 
embryonic legal framework which, at the very least, has provided a degree of legitimacy to the 
notion of space mining. While it is not yet a reality, it has moved, at least in part, out of the 
realm of science fiction. 
 
C.  Small Solar System Bodies: Asteroids and Comets 
 
 
115Fabrizio Bernardini, et al., Implications for Resource Utilization on Mars - Recent Discoveries and Hypotheses, 
71 J. OF THE BRIT. INTERPLANETARY SOC’Y 186, 188 (2018). 
116See Alan Boyle, Big-time Players are Getting Serious about Asteroid Perils and Profits, NBC NEWS (APR. 
16, 2013), http://cosmiclog.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/04/16/17782885-big-time-players-are-getting-serious-
about-asteroid-perils-and-profits?lite; Jeff Foust, Planetary Resources Believes Asteroid Mining Has Come of 
Age, THE SPACE REVIEW (Apr. 30, 2012), http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2074/1; Paul Rincon, New 
Venture “to Mine Asteroids, BBC NEWS (Jan. 22, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-
21144769 
117See Elizabeth Pearson, Space Mining: the New Goldrush, SCIENCE FOCUS (Dec. 11, 2018), 
https://www.sciencefocus.com/space/space-mining-the-new-goldrush/; Morgon Saletta & Kevin Orrman-
Rossiter, All of Humanity Should Share in the Space Mining Boom, THE CONVERSATION (Apr. 17, 2016),  
http://theconversation.com/all-of-humanity-should-share-in-the-space-mining-boom-57740 
118See Mark Alpert, Making Money in Space, 10 SCI. AM. PRESENTS 92, 95 (1999); Tim Beardsley, The Way 
to Go in Space, 10 SCI. AM. PRESENTS 59, 60-61 (1999). 
119FABIO TRONCHETTI, THE EXPLOITATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES OF THE MOON AND OTHER CELESTIAL 
BODIES: A PROPOSAL FOR A LEGAL REGIME, 219 (Martinus Nijhoff, 2009). 
120Jeff Foust, The Asteroid Mining Bubble Has Burst, supra note XX. 
121https://asteroidminingcorporation.co.uk/about-us 
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Before delving into the questions of ore, the distribution of resources and the economic 
viability of extracting it, it is worth considering where exactly this material can be found. 
Asteroids have received quite a bit of attention these past few years and were the main target 
for both Deep Space Industry and Planetary Resources.  
  While asteroids do not appear directly in the Outer Space Treaty, they are subsumed 
under the general heading “other celestial bodies” (the Moon by contrast is specifically 
mentioned in the phrase ‘outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies’ which 
appears throughout the Outer Space Treaty122, though it is this authors reading that this is not 
intended to distinguish the Moon from other ‘celestial bodies’). It is not within the scope of 
this paper to explore what the Outer Space Treaty means by “other celestial bodies,” but 
broadly it means the planets, their moons and ‘small solar systems bodies’, such as asteroids, 
comets, Trans-Neptunian Objects (TNOs) and other similar bodies 123(there are those who 
question whether a “celestial body” as per the Outer Space Treaty needs to be a minimum 
size124, but this is not particularly relevant to the discussion below).  
“Small solar system bodies” essentially divide between asteroids and comets,125 
although as will be demonstrated the difference and division between the two is less than 
absolute. However, as David A. Rothery has written:  
 
Although planetary scientists have come to realize that the boundaries are 
somewhat blurred, these “junk” objects can be divided into three broad classes: 
asteroids, Trans-Neptunian objects, and comets.126 
 
An asteroid can be defined as “one of the small planetary bodies (also known as minor 
planets or planetoids) that mainly, but not exclusively, populate the region of the solar system 
between the orbits of Mars and Jupiter.”127  
 
A comet is a small solar system body with a highly eccentric orbit, that goes from 
periods close to the sun to often far out into the reaches of the solar system.128 The comets core 
is generally just a chunk of dusty ice only a few kilometres across.129  
 
Beyond Neptune, small icy bodies become common, these objects form what is known 
as the Kuiper Belt.130 Together with Scattered Disk131 objects these make up the TNOs which 
have a mass “200 times that of the asteroid belt (one-fifth of an Earth-mass), and in total there 
may be nearly 100,000 bodies more than 100 kilometres in size.”132 Pluto and Eris are both 
“Dwarf Planets” and TNOs.133 
 
122See as an example Article II of the Outer Space Treaty which reads “Outer space, including the moon and 
other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or 
occupation, or by any other means.” 
123Thomas Cheney (2019) Sovereignty, Jurisdiction, and Property in Outer Space: Space Resources, the 
Outer Space Treaty, and National Legislation (PhD thesis in preparation, University of Northumbria), 84-142 
124 Ernst Fasan, ‘Asteroids and other Celestial Bodies – Some Legal Differences’ (1998) 26 J. Space L. 33, 
40; Virgiliu Pop, Who Owns the Moon? Extraterrestrial Aspects of Land and Mineral Resources Ownership 
(Springer 2009), 53 
125
David A. Rothery Planets: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press 2010), 13 
126DAVID A. ROTHERY PLANETS: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION, 13 (Oxford University Press 2010). 
127M. Di Martino, supra note XX, at 303. 
128Rothery, supra note 116, at 15. 
129Rothery, supra note 116, at 15.  
130Rothery, supra note 116, at 14-15. 
131Rothery, supra note 116, at 14-15. 
132Rothery, supra note 116, at 14-15. 
133Rothery, supra note 116, at 14-15.  
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It is also worth bearing in mind that astronomical terms themselves are vague and “any 
small sized body orbiting the Sun could be defined as an asteroid.”134 Furthermore, the core or 
nuclei of a comet may over time become what would be classified as an asteroid as it is baked 
and stripped of its icy exterior by the Sun.135 Indeed, “some near-Earth objects are probably 
defunct comets with remnant water-ice surviving beneath their dusty surfaces.”136 
 
“Asteroids range downwards in size from 950 kilometres across (the diameter of Ceres, 
the largest example), with no lower limit.”137 While they were once assumed to be the remains 
of a destroyed planet they are now thought of as having never been part of a planet and the total 
mass of all asteroids is calculated at being less than a thousandth of the mass of Earth.138 Most 
asteroids orbit in the main belt between Mars and Jupiter, some do come closer towards the 
Sun and some do orbit beyond Saturn.139 “Asteroids are not strongly coloured, but can be 
grouped into several classes according to their reflectance spectrum.”140 
 
There are three main types of asteroids: stony, carbonaceous, and metallic; these divide 
into 24 subtypes of asteroid and 34 subtypes of meteorites.141 There are several different, 
overlapping classification systems for asteroids and meteorites, based on different methods of 
analysis and observation.142 Asteroid size is determined based on how much sunlight is either 
absorbed (near-infrared) or reflected (optical)143 and size only allows us to roughly define an 
asteroids mass given the variation in asteroid density.144 Further complication is added by the 
fact that groups of asteroids such as the Near-Earth Asteroids or Trojans etc are identified not 
by size or composition but the location of their obit within the solar system.145 
 
A Near Earth Asteroid (NEA) or Near-Earth Object (NEO), again highlighting the 
ambiguity, is one whose orbit is smaller than 1.3 AU.146 There are approximately 5000 known 
NEOs, and their orbital parameters are not constant, NEOs can move over time due to the 
gravitational influence of other solar system bodies.147 NEOs are primarily asteroids but there 
are comets among them. There are 20,000 NEOs larger than 100m diameter and over 10 million 
larger than 20m diameter. Martin Elvis notes that the data available on NEOs and asteroids 
more generally is very limited.148 
 
 
134M. Di Martino, supra note XX, at 72. 
135Lewis, supra note XX, at 32; David A. Rothery, supra note 116, at 15. 
136ROTHERY, supra note 116 at XX. 
137Id. at 13. 
138David A. Rothery Planets: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press 2010), 13-14 
139Id. at 13-14. 
140Id. at 103. 
141 Martin Elvis, ‘Prospecting Asteroid Resources’ in Viorel Badescu (eds), Asteroids: Prospective Energy 
and Material Resources (Springer 2013), 88-89 
142 Martin Elvis, ‘Prospecting Asteroid Resources’ in Viorel Badescu (eds), Asteroids: Prospective Energy 
and Material Resources (Springer 2013), 88-91 
143Martin Elvis, ‘Prospecting Asteroid Resources’ in Viorel Badescu (eds), Asteroids: Prospective Energy and 
Material Resources (Springer 2013), 95-96 
144Martin Elvis, ‘Prospecting Asteroid Resources’ in Viorel Badescu (eds), Asteroids: Prospective Energy 
and Material Resources (Springer 2013), 98 
145Elvis, supra note XX at 88-98. 
146MICHAEL K. SHEPARD, ASTEROIDS: RELICS OF ANCIENT TIME PAGE NUMBER????(Cambridge 
University Press 2015). 
147M. Di Martino, supra note XX at 190-199. 
148Martin Elvis, How Many Ore-Bearing Asteroids?, 91 Planetary and Space Science 20, 20-21 (2014). 
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Different, overlapping classification systems for asteroids and meteorites, 
spectrographic tools are not yet sophisticated or accurate enough to form clear picture, not for 
commercial purposes and certainly not to form the basis of a legal regime. NEOs are 
categorized by orbit not by size or composition.  Asteroid size is determined based on how 
much sunlight is either absorbed (near-infrared) or reflected (optical).  Size only roughly 
defines mass given variation in asteroid density149 
 
D. Moon vs Asteroids? 
 
The Moon is also a target for space miners attention, and after the demise of both 
asteroid mining companies, Deep Space Industries and Planetary Resources, it is probably the 
most likely place that space resource utilization activities will begin.  
 
First when discussing moons, is the need to differentiate between the Moon and 
moon(s), the Moon is the one in orbit of the Earth150 and is specifically mentioned in the Outer 
Space Treaty.151 The Moon is a substantial body and, “if the Moon were to orbit the Sun 
independently there is no doubt that it would be ranked among the “terrestrial planets.”152 The 
Moon has been called the Moon for as long as it is possible to trace in Germanic languages.153 
 
Moon(s) are “smaller bodies close enough to orbit the planet rather than the Sun.”154 
Or put another way “planets go around the Sun, and moons go around their planets…”155 
However, due to the effect of their planet’s gravity anything in orbit around a moon is 
inherently unstable therefore no moon has a moon.156 This section is focused on Earth’s Moon.  
 
One of the major differences between the Moon and asteroids is that there are a 
considerable number, potentially even millions, of asteroids but Earth has only one Moon. The 
Outer Space Treaty groups “the Moon into the same category as other celestial bodies.”157 
Therefore it is reasonable to consider whether they should be treated the same, as the Moon is 
a more finite ‘resource’ perhaps therefore necessitating a stricter process for coordinating 
access and use. This logically extends to the debate surrounding the resources found within 
these bodies. Outer space, includes the Moon and other celestial bodies, as per the formulation 
that finds expression in nearly every article of the Outer Space Treaty, however the drafters of 
that treaty did debate whether or not to deal with just “outer space” or the “celestial bodies” as 
well, as is evident from the differing proposed drafts.158 Even the Moon Agreement, which 
given its name would seemingly only deal with ‘the Moon’, had its scope broadened to include 
the other celestial bodies.159 Furthermore, physical reality (such as differences in size and 
gravity as well as general accessibility), as well as the distribution of resources on the Moon 
 
149Martin Elvis, Prospecting Asteroid Resources, supra note XX at 81-129, 88-98. 
150David A. Rothery Moons: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press 2015), 17 
151Outer Space Treaty 
152Rothery, supra note XX, at 17. 
153Id. 
154Id., at 11-12. 
155Id., at 15. 
156Id., at 15-16. 
157Christopher J. Newman, Seeking Tranquillity: Embedding Sustainability in Lunar Exploration Policy, 33 
SPACE POL’Y 29, 35 (2015). 
158See UNGA Res 1348 (XIII) (13 December 1958); UNGA Res 1472 (XIV) (12 December 1959);  UNGA 
Res 1721 (XVI) (20 December 1961) UN Doc A/A987; UN Doc A/6327; UN Doc A/6341, 1-3; UN Doc A/6352, 
1-4; UN Doc A/AC.105/32, 1-6  
159BIN CHENG, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW, 362-3 (Clarendon Press, 1997). 
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and the existence of some unique attributes such as the so-called “peaks of eternal light”160 add 
heft to this consideration. As Christopher Newman has written: 
 
“This conflation of the Moon with other celestial bodies has contaminated all 
debate and discussion regarding the legal status of the Moon. Policy makers and 
lawyers need to acknowledge that the Moon is separate from other celestial 
bodies, and the issues it faces are unique.”161 
 
There are two provisions of the Outer Space Treaty that need to be borne in mind.  
These are the provisions on the avoidance of “harmful contamination” found in Article IX, and 
the requirements that space be used in the interests and for the benefit of all countries and 
humanity in Article I.  Granted, neither of these aspects of the treaty have been particularly 
well elaborated but they do and can have consequences. 
 
Article IX is potentially a foundation stone for the creation of an environmental space 
law. There are a number of aspects that could come into play. First, the potential to contaminate 
or even destroy sites of scientific interest is a high and very real risk especially given the low 
level of exploration of the Moon.  However, it is also worth noting that lunar resource activities 
operations can (and most likely will) be done in support of scientific expeditions as well as for 
purely commercial purposes.  Ultimately, in situ resource utilization (“ISRU”) will enable 
greater and cheaper exploration of the Moon and other celestial bodies.  However, there are 
also sites of historic importance, most notably the Apollo 11 landing site, as well as areas that 
are of aesthetic value and worth preserving in their own right. In the author’s view, The Hague 
Working Group’s Draft Building Blocks at least begin to address some of these concerns, but 
further consideration is needed. There may be similar concerns with regards to some of the 
more significant asteroids (such as Ceres) but these are mainly issues that will be relevant to 
the Moon and, later on, the other terrestrial planets and moons. 
Article I stipulates that “use” of outer space, the Moon, and other celestial bodies “shall 
be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries.”162 There is, once again, no 
clear meaning as to what this means. The Space Benefits Declaration163 was an attempt to 
develop this aspect of the Outer Space Treaty in a General Assembly Resolution.164 While 
developing States have tried to argue that this provision requires some sort of technology, 
benefits and/or profit sharing, since the Space Benefits Declaration understanding has 
developed away from this a more to broader provision of access to the benefits of space 
technology as well as general international cooperation in space.165 
 
It is apparent that international cooperation has increasingly developed 
according to the principles laid down in the Declaration on Space Benefits. 
Despite divergent views on the specific requirements of benefit sharing present 
during the negotiations of the Declaration and remaining to this day, States still 
 
160A ‘peak of eternal light’ is a location on the surface of a celestial body that enjoys permanent or near 
permanent sunlight, see: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peak_of_eternal_light 
161Newman, supra note XX, at 35. 
162Outer Space Treaty, Article I 
163UNGA Res 51/122 (1996) 
164Elena Carpanelli and Brendan Cohen (2012) “A Legal Assessment of the 1996 Declaration on Space Benefits 
on the Occasion of its Fifteenth Anniversary” 38 Journal of Space Law 1, 3 
165Elena Carpanelli and Brendan Cohen (2012) “A Legal Assessment of the 1996 Declaration on Space Benefits 
on the Occasion of its Fifteenth Anniversary” 38 Journal of Space Law 1, 31-35 
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provide access to the benefits of space technology, albeit in ways that mirror 
their understanding of the Declaration.166 
  
 
166Ibid, 35  
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 IV. CONSIDERATIONS OF ECONOMIC VIABILITY AND EQUITY 
 
As discussed above, there is an abundance of interesting and useful material in the solar 
system, from iron, platinum group metals or water, however, the distribution and accessibility 
of this material is less clear, especially when the economic viability of extraction is considered. 
One of the concerns about the developments of a space resource activities framework is that it 
will be based, essentially, on a ‘first come first served’ basis which will, once again, 
disadvantage developing States as the ‘spacefaring’ States167 will scoop up the lowest hanging 
fruit before the developing States have a chance to get in on the action. This would likely  
exacerbate the inequality between the rich States and the poor States.  Given the abundance of 
resources potentially available in the solar system it may seem that this is not an issue, however 
this is worth examining.168 
 
Ore, as used by the terrestrial mining industry, means commercial profitable material. 
"Ore is not simply a high concentration of some resource, but includes consideration of the cost 
of extraction of the resource and its price."169 Therefore, when talking about the material wealth 
of the solar system it is not enough to simply talk about the vast quantities of material that is 
available in the totality of the system but the quantity of ore is what needs to be discussed. Now 
ore is obviously something of a fluid concept as what constitutes economically viable will 
change based on technological development as well as the market price of the resource in 
question.  
 
Martin Elvis claims that focus should be on NEOs because main belt is “too hard to 
reach”.170 NEOs are primarily asteroids but there are comets among them.171 There are 20,000 
NEOs larger than 100m diameter and over 10 million larger than 20m diameter.172 Elvis 
assessed NEOS for both platinum group metals and water. Elvis notes that the data available 
on NEOs and asteroids more generally is very limited. He assesses that the range of profitability 
based on the size of a PGM asteroid is quite vast, asteroids in excess of 100m diameter are 
most promising for PGM, smaller asteroids rapidly become unpromising targets.173 "Good size 
and mass estimates are thus crucial to asteroid mining."174 
  
 
167‘Spacefaring State’ is a variable term, hence the use of inverted commas. It could apply to those States which 
have substantial and regular launch capability such as China (People’s Republic of), France, India, Japan, 
United States. There are other States which have the ability to launch payloads but not necessarily regularly, 
such as Iran and Israel. There are a wider circle of ‘active’ participants in space, Germany, for example has a 
robust space programme, the United Kingdom has a significant commercial space industry although neither 
have an ‘indigenous’ launch capability and are reliant upon the launch vehicles of other States to ‘access’ space. 
However, broadly in this usage ‘spacefaring’ State is used in the sense of ‘States whose interests are specially 
affected’ as per North Sea Continental Shelf cases, ICJ Reports 1969, p.3, 43, para 74 
168JOHN S. LEWIS, MINING THE SKY: UNTOLD RICHES FROM THE ASTEROIDS, COMETS AND 
PLANETS, 112 (Helix Books, 1997); M. DI MARTINO, ET AL., THE ASTEROID HAZARD: 
EVALUATING AND AVOIDING THE THREAT OF ASTEROID IMPACTS, 195 (1st ed., European Space 
Agency 2009). 
169Martin Elvis, How Many Ore-Bearing Asteroids?, 91 PLANETARY AND SPACE SCIENCE 20, 20 (2014). 
170
Martin Elvis, How Many Ore-Bearing Asteroids?, 91 PLANETARY AND SPACE SCIENCE 20, 20 (2014). 
171 Martin Elvis, How Many Ore-Bearing Asteroids?, 91 PLANETARY AND SPACE SCIENCE 20, 20 (2014). 
172
Martin Elvis, How Many Ore-Bearing Asteroids?, 91 PLANETARY AND SPACE SCIENCE 20, 20 (2014). 
173Elvis at 20-23. 
174Elvis at 23. 
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Elvis argues that 100m diameter seems like an “optimistic” estimate for a profitability 
threshold, granted the costs of resource activity missions are yet unknown.175 And there are 
about 20,000 NEOs, however he estimates that the number of commercially viable (ore-
bearing) NEOs (given costs of mission and getting to and from object etc) is only about 10 
(assuming an outbound delta-v of 4.5km/s) though he stresses "that this number has large 
uncertainties and includes only metallic asteroids. Nonetheless, the number is surely smaller 
than would-be asteroid miners may have expected."176 
 
Elvis does note that if he allows for a slightly higher outbound delta-v assumption 
(5.5km/s) then the number of PGM ore-bearing NEOs would rise to about 100.177 "Water is 
often considered the first product likely to be mined from space. The water would be used in 
space either for life support or, separated into hydrogen and oxygen, for rocket fuel."178 Smaller 
NEOs are more viable targets for water miners than PGM.179 Elvis reckons that there are about 
9000 water ore-bearing NEOs for outbound delta-v assumption of 4.5km/s and allowing for 
the same increase to 5.5km/s that would rise to about 90000.180 "Clearly improved surveys to 
find and characterize small NEOs would be extremely helpful in making the profitable mining 
of asteroids water feasible."181 Elvis points out that there are also significant engineering 
questions that would force an adjustment of the assessment of what would constitute a 
profitable NEO.182 Elvis estimates that there are relatively few ore-bearing NEOs. Though 
water-ore-bearing NEOs will be more plentiful and easier to find.183 "Initial estimates give very 
low values for platinum group metals, larger, but still modest, numbers for water."184 
 
That said, understanding of distribution of material has improved due to various 
broadband sky surveys but our understanding of asteroid composition has not improved all that 
much. However, with the exception of the largest asteroids, spacecraft surveys will be the only 
way to determine composition of asteroids,185 and to date spacecraft have visited 12 
asteroids.186 At least for MAB asteroids their “parent” body was probably hot enough to cause 
enough internal heating to give rise to differentiation which means that the remaining fragments 
(todays asteroids) will have different compositions (including metallic iron from the core).187 
 
 DEVELOPING AN INTERNATIONAL REGIME 
 
A. Do We Need a Space Property Rights Regime? 
 
 
175
Martin Elvis, How Many Ore-Bearing Asteroids?, 91 PLANETARY AND SPACE SCIENCE 20, 22-23 (2014). 
176 Elvis at 23. 
177Id. at 23. 
178Id. at 23. 
179Id. at 24. 
180Id. at 24. 
181Id. at 24. 
182Id. at 24-25. 
183Id. at 25. 
184Id. at 26. 
185N.E. Bowles et al., CASTAway: An Asteroid Main Belt Tour and Survey, 62 ADVANCES IN SPACE RESEARCH 
8, 1998-2025 (2018), 2004-2005 
186N.E. Bowles et al., CASTAway: An Asteroid Main Belt Tour and Survey, 62 ADVANCES IN SPACE RESEARCH 
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187N.E. Bowles et al., CASTAway: An Asteroid Main Belt Tour and Survey, 62 ADVANCES IN SPACE RESEARCH 8, 
1998-2025 (2018), 2004-2005 
23 
 
Some within the space sector have argued that private business needs clear, defined 
property rights to succeed and that legal stability and certainty is also vital to the health and 
success of industry. 188  This therefore means that any meaningful investment in space resource 
activities requires legal certainty and security, which is currently not provided by the existing 
space law regime. Ricky J. Lee, for example, claims that the process of exploration of celestial 
bodies and extraction of material would be the aspect of the space resource activities process 
that would encounter the most legal difficulties (compared with launch etc.) and that the need 
for exclusivity in resource activity operations may mean it is impossible under the current space 
law regime.189 He estimated that a space resource activity venture would require capitalization 
of 100 billion USD190 and that “private investment on such a scale can be feasible only with a 
substantial degree of certainty in the rights to explore, extract and exploit the mineral resources 
on celestial bodies.”191 Others have argued that the current space property rights regime is a 
barrier not just to space resource activities but to commercial development in general. Richard 
Berkley has written that “the current public law regime in outer space retards private activity 
in space.”192 While Yun Zhao has gone so far as to say that the current space law regime “is 
the primary impediment to the commercial development of outer space.”193 
 
Economists and lawyers broadly agree on the necessity of property rights and the rule 
of law for economic and business success. This position has a long history, Lord Mansfield, in 
the eighteenth century, argued that commerce needs legal certainty in order to thrive.194  It is 
widely acknowledged that economic activity requires as much stability as possible which the 
rule of law helps to provide195 and as Lord Bingham has written, “no one would choose to do 
business, perhaps involving large sums of money in a country where the parties” rights and 
obligations were vague or undecided.”196 Although it is worth noting that not all economists 
agree that property rights are vital for economic development or agree with the narrative that 
property rights have been the primary driver of economic development. Thomas Piketty has 
argued that the diffusion of knowledge and skills has been the primary driver of growth, 
particularly over the long term.197  The resource extraction industry, in particular, has 
demonstrated that strong property rights and the rule of law are not necessarily vital for even 
 
188See generally, Richard Berkley, Space Law Versus Space Utilization: The Inhibition of Private Industry in 
Outer Space, (1997) 15 WIS. INTL L.J. 421, 428 (1997); Bryon C. Brittingham, Does the World Really Need New 
Space Law? 12 OR. REV. INT’L L. 31, 34, 47 (2010); FABIO TRONCHETTI, THE EXPLOITATION OF NATURAL 
RESOURCES OF THE MOON AND OTHER CELESTIAL BODIES: A PROPOSAL FOR A LEGAL REGIME, 225, 237 
(Martinus Nijhoff, 2009); MATTHEW J. KLEIMAN, THE LITTLE BOOK OF SPACE LAW, 140 (American Bar 
Association, 2012); JAMES CLAY MOLTZ, CROWDED ORBITS: CONFLICT AND COOPERATION IN SPACE, 98 
(Columbia University Press 2014). 
189 RICKY J. LEE, LAW AND REGULATION OF COMMERCIAL MINING OF MINERALS IN OUTER SPACE, 11, 13-14, 
95-6 (Springer 2012). 
190RICKY J. LEE, LAW AND REGULATION OF COMMERCIAL MINING OF MINERALS IN OUTER SPACE, 11, 13-14, 95-
6 (Springer 2012). 
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PERSPECTIVE, 5-6 (Nova, 2009). 
194Hamilton v. Mendes, 2 Burr 1198, 1214 (1761); Vallejo and Another v. Wheeler, 1 Cowp 143, 153 (1774). 
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Belknap Press, 2014). 
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large-scale investments; the resource extraction industry often operates in states with insecure 
property rights and a weak adherence to the rule of law.198 
 
While there is certainly a broad consensus regarding the importance of property rights, 
there is a debate regarding the best way to create a property rights regime. While there are 
numerous possible approaches there are two that are most relevant to the space resources 
discussion. The first approach is to develop a ‘top down’ regime in advance of economic 
development. The other is to allow a regime to develop organically and codify the regime that 
emerges. Economically, organic development tends to be the most efficient as those who 
develop the norms have a stake in making it so.199 However, economic efficiency is not the 
only aspect to consider. 
 
It is important that property rights are properly defined but it is vital that property rights 
are properly enforced. Without effective enforcement, property rights do not really exist.200 As 
Sandra Joireman wrote in her study of property rights in common law Africa, “without the 
enforcement of laws related to property, or indeed to any other area of legal rights, the law may 
as well not exist.”201  Property is an economic and social concept and “the enforcement of 
property rights is fundamentally political.”202 Property rights and their enforcement 
mechanisms are embedded within and dependent upon the political system, they cannot be 
separated.203 When constructing a property rights regime, it is therefore vital to consider how 
those property rights are going to be enforced, and how disputes will be resolved (preferably 
as quickly and easily as possible.) The importance of enforcement to the effectiveness of a 
property rights system was demonstrated by the North American beaver trade of the nineteenth 
century. The US Government passed numerous laws designed to regulate the trade in beavers, 
partly to conserve supply and partly to avoid unnecessarily antagonizing Native Americans. 
However, with few US troops west of the Mississippi the US Government was completely 
incapable of enforcing these regulations and preventing the virtual eradication of the beaver 
population as a viable source of furs.204 
 
Though there is more to this than just the government’s ability to physically enforce the 
law. Property rights as defined in statute need to be in harmony with the reality on the 
ground.205 Joireman found that when the official property rights system does not work or is 
inefficient (or simply out of reach), an informal system arises in parallel or in replacement of 
the official system.206 If the ‘transaction costs’ involved in defining and enforcing property 
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rights are too high then actors will either not bother or will operate outside the official 
system.207 Ostrom argues that there is no single solution to this but that the key is getting the 
‘institutions’ right.208 However, this does not necessarily mean a formal institution but can be 
an informal arrangement.209 It requires a flexible situation and recognizing that different 
approaches are necessary for differing situations. For example, the ability to exclude and the 
nature of the resource are important factors in the ability to develop bottom-up solutions.210 
Furthermore, the nature and makeup of the community involved are important in the success 
of less formalised models.211 One of the key messages Ostrom provides is the need to 
understand the situation before devising a solution212, this presents a problem with regards to 
space resources, as there are many unknowns. 
 
A property rights regime is necessary, property rights are vital to economic development.213 
However, there is more to it than simply creating a law granting property rights to space 
resources. In order for any property rights over space resources to have value they need to be 
enforceable. The regime also needs to have the support and acceptance of the community of 
actors. It is one thing to be able to enforce property rights by force, either through private means 
or the backing of a States, but it is better to not have to other actors respect your property rights 
without the ‘transaction costs’ involved in maintaining constant vigilance. In outer space, this 
means an international regime. As mentioned, this does not necessarily mean the creation of a 
body akin to the International Seabed Authority, but it does mean the creation of some sort of 
system for mutual recognition and acceptance. This regime need to be flexible, given the 
numerous unknowns about space resources and the nature of the industry to extract them, but 
it is vital that it has international legitimacy, so that it is effective. 
 
B. An International Regime for Conflict Prevention 
 
The Outer Space Treaty celebrates its fiftieth “birthday” this year, the governance 
regime that it established has served space well. Space has become a vital part of Earth”s 
infrastructure and economy, which has been made possible by the order and stability provided 
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by the space law regime which rests upon the Outer Space Treaty.214 Space resource activities 
have the potential to undermine the stability of the space law regime. There are three main 
potential friction points which will be discussed below. The first potential conflict is over the 
legality of space resource activities themselves, with a second potential area of conflict being 
over the actual resources being extracted and the third over the distribution of the profits (or 
benefits) from space resource activities. These three issues have the potential to destabilise or 
delegitimize the space law regime without which the economic value of space would 
considerably diminish.  
 
C. Conflict Over the Legality of Space Mining 
 
The first potential area for conflict or crisis in space law is over the legality of space 
resource activities themselves. There was a hint of this at the 2016 Legal Subcommittee (LSC) 
session of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS) 
when several delegations, most notably that of the Russian Federation, strongly objected to and 
criticised the United States’ Space Resource Exploration and Utilization Act of 2015. Criticism 
focused on the perceived unilateral nature of the US space law.215 This has not deterred the US 
or Luxembourg or the other few countries considering space resource activities laws from 
proceeding. Indeed, as discussed above the general trend is toward accepting that space 
resource activities are permitted under the freedom of use” found within Article I of the Outer 
Space Treaty albeit subject to certain restrictions.216 
 
However, it is worth considering the counter-arguments the legality of space resource 
activities and the US and Luxembourg position in particular. There are essentially three 
arguments. The first is that Article II of the Outer Space Treaty creates a total prohibition on 
property rights in space and this includes commercial space resource activities operations. The 
second is that these national laws are an act of sovereignty and are therefore incompatible with 
the space law regime. The third is that space resource activities can only be legal under an 
international regime. The counter-argument to this is that it is a valid interpretation of 
international law and within the rights of states to do this. 
 
If a strict interpretation of the term ‘appropriation’ is taken then it can be argued that 
Article II of the Outer Space Treaty prohibits any and all appropriation. Under this line of 
argument, while a resource can be physically removed from a celestial body it remains legally 
indistinguishable from the celestial body. In effect you have merely created celestial body ‘a’ 
and celestial body ‘b’. The portion that you have extracted is no more ‘appropriable’ than the 
part that ‘remains’.  This would mean that commercial space resource activities would be a 
violation of international space law.217 
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An alternate argument and the one put forth by several States at the 2016 session of the 
Legal Subcommittee of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space is that the US 
space resource activities law constitutes an act of national appropriation which is incompatible 
with the Outer Space Treaty.218 The argument is that authorising resource activities and/or 
granting title over extracted resources is an act of national appropriation which is in violation 
of Article II.  This is because in order for a government to have the authority to regulate an 
activity (such as you may mine this area) they need to have jurisdiction over the area the activity 
is being conducted in which therefore violates Article II of the Outer Space Treaty. 
Alternatively, the government in question is granting title to the extracted resource and is thus 
claiming ownership as you cannot transfer ownership of something you do not possess 
yourself.219  
 
A third potential argument is that space resources are part of the ‘global commons’ and 
therefore require an international regime in order to be legitimately authorised. As the 
‘province of all Mankind’ space belongs to the international community, and therefore no 
individual state has the right to authorise its nationals to conduct resource activities within it, 
only the international community working together, preferably through the United Nations can 
sanction space resource activities. This holds even more true for those States who are party to 
the Moon Agreement, who look towards Article 11 of that treaty.220 
 
The counterargument to these three viewpoints, and the one put forth by the United 
States, Luxembourg, and a few others, is that the view that it is within the purview of states to 
authorize space resource activities is a legitimate interpretation of the Outer Space Treaty and 
it is within the rights of a State Party to unilaterally interpret their obligations under a treaty.221 
Both the US and Luxembourg make no claim to territorial sovereignty or control over any 
celestial body either in whole or in part, or indeed to the resources in situ.222 They are regulating 
the activities of their nationals as they are required to do by Article VI of the Outer Space 
Treaty.223 Furthermore, the United States rejects the requirement for an international regime as 
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they are not party to the Moon Agreement and therefore are not bound by it.224 Luxembourg is 
also not a party to the Moon Agreement.225 
 
If two blocks emerge, one which regards space resource activities as legal and 
legitimate and another which regards either space resource activities or the legal regime 
underpinning it as incompatible with international law and/or illegitimate then this has the 
potential to undermine the space law regime itself. This is particularly a concern if those States 
engaged in space resource activities feel they need to circumvent the UN centred system. Given 
the nature of space it needs to be governed by an internationally recognized and respected 
regime in order to be workable. Therefore, a breakdown in the established space law regime 
could prove seriously detrimental to the value of the space environment for all actors. 
 
D. Conflict Over Resources 
 
A second potential source of conflict is over resources themselves. It is quite clear that 
there is an abundance of resources in the solar system however where those resources are 
located and how easy they are to access is not as clear. The initial target for space resource 
activities will likely be the Near-Earth Asteroids (NEOs) as their location makes them 
relatively easy to access even compared to the Moon.226 However, there is still a lot we do not 
know about the distribution of resources among NEOs,227 as discussed above. If easy to access 
resource rich asteroids turn out to indeed be a rarity, then that could cause problems 
 
The US and Luxembourg space resource activities laws only apply to their respective 
nationals. This is not necessarily a problem if the space resource activities industry is restricted 
to a handful of actors but as ‘informal’ agreement could work under such circumstances, 
particularly if the actors are similar enough. However, it could be a potential source of conflict 
were two companies from two different states to try and mine the same asteroid, particularly if 
there were geopolitical considerations for the authorising States (such as say, between the 
United States and China). There is of course the provision in Article IX of the Outer Space 
Treaty against “harmful interference” with another State’s space activities but what exactly that 
means is unclear. 
 
Given the cost and complexity of accessing space it seems unlikely that actual armed 
conflict will happen in space any time in the near future, at least beyond Low Earth Orbit 
(LEO). However, it is not inconceivable given the vast potential wealth available. Furthermore, 
it would not be unprecedented either, organizations like the East India Companies had vast 
navies and armies to protect their wealth and even today the resource extraction industry is not 
shy in employing private military contractors to protect their investments in the more dangerous 
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areas of the developing world. 228However, conflict over resources is much more likely to take 
the form of legal and diplomatic conflict than the armed variety. This will all have a cost of 
course and has the potential to undermine the legitimacy and effectiveness of the overall space 
law regime, especially if the existing system is unable to satisfactorily resolve disputes. 
 
E. E. Need for Discussion and International Coordination 
 
The cost of accessing space makes it seem unlikely that any actor would be willing to 
engage in armed conflict in order to settle a dispute arising from space resource activities. 
However, it has to be said that humans do have a talent for figuring out how to wage war in 
any and all environments, and the recent discussions of the development of a “space force” in 
the US and elsewhere indicate that we certainly cannot rule that out as a possibility.229 Although 
diplomatic, trade and legal strife all have their own costs and can also be significant hindrances 
to the development and expansion of development and commerce. Fortunately, there is still 
time to avoid these problems, space resource activities have not yet caused a crisis in space 
law, or indeed even begun in earnest. The space resources industry is still very much in 
development and therefore time is right to begin international coordination. 
 
Recently it has been suggested that the Outer Space Treaty needs to be replaced or 
‘updated’,230 however a new treaty is likely not feasible in the current international climate. 
Besides given the embryonic state of the space resource activities industry a new treaty may 
actually be too formal and inflexible an instrument. It is to ‘soft law’ (non-binding instruments) 
that we should look. Given the early stage of development the industry is in and the low number 
of actors currently and for the foreseeable future the industry can probably get away with a 
significant degree of self-coordination. Some kind of code of conduct agreement would 
probably do the trick, though it would not be sufficient for just industry to be involved, given 
their responsibilities under Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty, States would have to be 
involved.231 But the reverse is also true, it would not be sufficient simply for the states to be 
involved. Fortunately, the process has already begun. As discussed, The Hague Space 
Resources Governance Working Group is currently working on a set of proposals for an 
agreement relating to the governance of space resource activities.232This is a positive start.  
 
Space resource activities have the potential to be a bonanza for human civilization. The 
wealth of the solar system is immense. However, there is potential for conflict and crisis. The 
history of terrestrial colonisation demonstrates that, and it was a repeat of the ‘scramble for 
colonies’ that the drafters of the Outer Space Treaty hoped to avoid.233 It is not enough for 
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space resource activities to be legal; it needs to be considered a legitimate activity too. The 
onus is on the space resource activities industry to ensure that they are seen as ‘good global 
citizens.’ By participating in efforts such as The Hague Space Governance Resources Working 
Group at least some members of the industry demonstrate that they recognize this. Space 
resource activities are in their early days, there is still plenty of time to make sure the space 
governance regime adapts in a way that can benefit all concerned, but it will not happen by 
itself. 
 
 WHAT’S THE RUSH? THE CASE FOR SLOWING DOWN AND TAKING STOCK 
 
In the wake of Planetary Resources and Deep Space Industries announcements and the 
subsequent enactment of legislation in the United States and the declared intent to follow suit 
in Luxembourg there was an abundance of interest in the legality and potential of space 
resource activities.234 While there is arguably a general need to  ‘update’ or ‘modernize’ 
international space law in order to give it scope to allow and/or regulate this novel activity (or 
prohibit it) it is also the case that, space resource activities are no more (or less) imminent today 
than they were in 2012. Prospecting for space resources may be an activity on the horizon, and 
there are reasonable concerns about the ability to adequately protect interests in prospective 
‘mining’ sites (after all exclusivity is pretty indistinguishable from appropriation) but the actual 
activity of prospecting is little different from explorative and scientific activities which are 
clearly permitted by the Outer Space Treaty and broader body of space law. Further, there is 
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certainly no reason to suppose that an activity that has been conducted by several government 
space agencies should be proscribed for non-governmental entities.  
 
While predicting timelines for technological developments is difficult, the history of 
the space industry suggests that one should assume a longer development timeframe, especially 
when the industry is advancing such a timeframe themselves.235 It seems reasonable to assume 
a 20-30-year development timeframe for space resource activities given that there have as yet 
been no prospecting missions, no mining equipment developed, and the time it takes to get to 
the objects that these entities wish to mine.236 Therefore, especially given the demise of the two 
leading contenders for the status of ‘pioneer operators’237 it is clear that there is abundant time 
to consider an appropriate regime. This is important as there is a need to accommodate several 
potentially conflicting aspects. 
 
The Moon needs protecting. This does not mean a complete moratorium on space 
resource activities, or indeed any activity on the Moon but there does need to be a recognition 
that there are sites of historical, scientific, aesthetic, and cultural value that need to be protected. 
This is potentially true on other planets and moons but given the centrality of the Moon to 
humanity for millennia it is particularly true on our Moon. Furthermore, this doesn ot 
necessarily need any “hard law” options, a code of conduct, or some other ‘soft law’ agreement, 
like the space debris mitigation guidelines, that States, through their national legislation, 
require their nationals to comply with (i.e. it’s binding via national law but not on States via 
international law). There are at least two efforts underway to do things like this, be it some of 
the stipulations in The Hague Space Resources Governance Working Group’s Draft Building 
Blocks238 and For All Moonkind’s registry of historical sites.239  
 
There is also an equity and even sustainability issue to give consideration. As discussed 
above economically viable asteroids are not necessarily as common as we think. Therefore, 
there is a responsibility to ensure equitable access to resources for all states. There is a moral 
imperative to do this but also a legal responsibility given the provisions of Article I of the Outer 
Space Treaty. Therefore, there is a need to insure a reserve of (comparatively) easily accessible 
ore bearing objects for those States which will be late to the space mining game owing to 
historical and developmental handicaps.  This is particularly the case if the number of ore 
bearing objects is towards the lower end of the scale. 
 
It is also important to recognize that it is beneficial to allow property rights to develop 
from the “grassroots” and that there are potentially negative consequences for imposing a top-
down system of property rights, especially when those who are doing the imposing have limited 
stakes in their development. Not only can it prove to be economically inefficient, especially 
when a “one size fits all” model is applied (as for example with the US Homestead Act which 
imposed a uniform model of farm on wildly different climatic areas of North America240) but 
it is important that the actors involved have a stake in the process, if the property rights regime 
doesn’t work it will be circumvented, and this may lead to conflict, which would be precisely 
what any international space resources activities regime would be designed to prevent. 
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Additionally, it is vital that property rights are enforceable, granted this should be a 
given, but it is potentially a bigger issue than it may seem at first. As discussed, part of the 
issue with the current approach being taken to the regulation of space resource activities is that 
it is being done at the national level. In and of itself this is not particularly an issue, and States 
do have an obligation under Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty to “authorise and supervise” 
the activities of their nationals in outer space and therefore do need a domestic legal framework 
for doing so.241 However, in order to avoid any issues relating to the provisions of Article II of 
the Outer Space Treaty242, the basis for this legislation needs to be on the personal jurisdiction 
that States enjoy over their nationals. This jurisdiction does not extend to foreign nationals, 
which could make protecting property rights over space resources particularly problematic 
without a multilateral framework for some form of mutual recognition (as envisioned by The 
Hague Working Group’s Draft Building Blocks.243) Again, this is a potential source of conflict, 
especially if space, and space resources, come to be seen as an increasingly strategic asset. 
 
Furthermore, property rights evolve and adapt to suit novel situations and 
circumstances.  When miners, ranchers and farmers spread into the American West it became 
clear that the water rights regime that had worked well in water abundant Western Europe and 
had been successfully transplanted to the Eastern United States was not suitable for the arid 
conditions in the American west, so a new approach was devised. Similarly, in South Africa 
and Australia, settlers adapted and evolved property rights regimes to suit local conditions. 
Additionally, during the gold rushes there where shifts in the approaches to property rights in 
the various stages of the rushes, recognizing that there was a different need between ‘panners’ 
and ‘miners’ (i.e. those who panned for gold in a stream vs those who had to dig mine shafts). 
This ties in with the previous point about involving the people with the greatest stake in the 
process of developing the property rights, but it also means that there is a need to avoid being 
particularly dogmatic about the nature of property as applied to space resource activities and 
indeed any use of outer space. Space is a unique environment, drastically different from any 
humanity has encountered, it makes sense that property, as an institution, will have to adapt 
and evolve to deal with the differences. 
 
The recent “demise” of the “pioneers” of asteroid based space resource activities, Deep 
Space Industries (acquired by Bradford Engineering B.V) and Planetary Resources (acquired 
by ConsenSys, Inc.), should be taken as an opportunity. There has been much activity, as has 
been discussed above, in various legislatures, at the United Nations, and through groups such 
as The Hague Space Resources Governance Working Group in the wake of the excitement 
generated by the initial announcements by Planetary Resources and Deep Space Industries 
several years ago, but the international community has been offered an opportunity to pause 
and reflect. There are still ventures pursuing space resource activities, although it now looks 
like the Moon is the likelier target for the first mining operations than any asteroid, but we 
should recognize that this is harder than and probably not as imminent as we, perhaps, once 
thought. While for many space enthusiasts this will be a disappointment, and indeed if 
humanity is truly to become a spacefaring civilization then it needs to develop an in-space 
economy and space resources, as well as dramatically reducing the cost of accessing space (at 
the very least by allowing in-orbit refuelling, reducing the quantity of propellant needed to be 
hauled out of Earth’s not insubstantial gravity well, as well as allowing for in-space 
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manufacturing thus reducing the amount of stuff needed to be brought into space from Earth’s 
surface), will be a foundation for that economy. However, as this project is an epochal 
endeavour, Elon Musk might talk about building cities on Mars within his lifetime244 but the 
task of developing humanity into a spacefaring civilization will take centuries if not millennia.  
There is virtue in slowing down. There is no need to rush to produce legislation or regulation 
for space resource activities, we have the time and the scope to give the proper care and 
consideration to this issue, and we owe it to ourselves and future generations to do just that. 
Lawyers are often accused of being reactive to events but in this instance, we have been 
proactive, but we need to ensure that we are not too proactive, and indeed we must strive to 
avoid being pre-emptive. We have the time to get this right, let us at least make an effort to not 
repeat the mistakes of history. The work of The Hague International Space Resources 
Governance Working Group and the ongoing discussions at UNCOPUOS are great first steps, 
but there is more to be done. 
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